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
Raymond A. Millen

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**PAX NATO: THE OPPORTUNITIES
OF ENLARGEMENT**

Raymond A. Millen

August 2002

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FOREWORD


Considering its long string of successes, it is curious that NATO has so many critics chanting the mantra of irrelevancy or decrying its post-Cold War initiatives. Paradoxically, pan-Europeanists seem quite willing to accept an ineffective security organization as long as it has a European label on it. Applying parochial protectionist practices on regional security may be irrevocable and certainly ruinous.

In this monograph, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen examines NATO's extraordinary performance and incisive initiatives during the immediate post-Cold War years. While other security organizations and concepts have faded in importance and utility, NATO has made sweeping changes to remain relevant, and its unique enforcement mechanism means it has no security peer. Organizationally, NATO remains the greatest cost effective hedge against future threats and possesses the greatest potential for the full spectrum of conflict, to include crisis management. Notwithstanding its successes, NATO does need to conduct simple reforms, which, if implemented, will result in enormous cost savings and greater interoperability among new and old members. Allied bickering may result, but if the United States insists on their implementation, all members will fall in line.

Lieutenant Colonel Millen scrutinizes the impact of enlargement on the Alliance, not only from a military but also a geopolitical perspective. He is quick to point out that, without the needed reforms, new members will bring more fat than muscle to the Alliance. However, the process of enlargement has served to harmonize Central and Eastern Europe with Western Europe in a remarkable manner. That achievement alone has made enlargement worthwhile. He goes beyond the next round of enlargement and makes a case for a reorientation of NATO enlargement towards the

Middle East and North African regions. They may never receive the full security umbrella of NATO, but they can enjoy the shade.

Lieutenant Colonel Millen provides a pragmatic roadmap for the future of NATO. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this insightful and controversial monograph as a topic of debate among European security specialists.


DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

RAYMOND A. MILLEN is currently assigned as the Director of European Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute. A lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army, he graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1982, was commissioned as an infantry officer, and has held a variety of command and staff assignments in Germany and Continental United States. He commanded a light infantry company during Operation JUST CAUSE, the invasion of Panama in 1990. Lieutenant Colonel Millen has also served as the U.S. Army Infantry School Liaison Officer to the German Infantry School at Hammelburg, Germany; Battalion Executive Officer, 3-502d Infantry, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and Chief of Intelligence Section and Balkans Team Chief, Survey Section, SHAPE, Belgium. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College, and holds an M.A. degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown University. He is a Foreign Area Officer for Western Europe. Lieutenant Colonel Millen has published articles in a number of scholarly and professional journals, including *Infantry Magazine* and the *Swiss Military Journal*. His book, *Command Legacy*, was published by Brassey's in April 2002.

SUMMARY

In addition to choosing new members, the NATO summit in Prague, to be held November 20-22, 2002, should strive to resolve two burning issues—the continued relevance of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Alliance's future orientation. If managed well, the summit could lay the foundation of European security and stability for the next century.

NATO has made and continues to make a profound contribution to European security and stability. Unlike all other security organizations, NATO has evolved as the strategic environment changed during the post-Cold War period and is well-positioned to resolve near term challenges. The Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), and NATO Enlargement initiatives reflect a dynamic and vibrant organization. Given its military component, NATO matches enforcement with words, something the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Western European Union (WEU), and the much vaunted European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) cannot.

The variegated Balkan conflicts exposed the inherent weaknesses of attempting to resolve conflicts with diplomacy but without the enforcement mechanism of a military arm. In each case, NATO broke the cycle of violence in a matter of weeks and set the conditions for peace. One fact has emerged that no others can lay claim to—NATO produces results.

Critics are quick to point out that NATO's relevance must be tied irrevocably to an imminent threat: no threat, no NATO. This simplistic approach to security presupposes that threats will never arise again, or if they do, sufficient time will exist for a coalition to form. Historically,

aggressors are not so accommodating. NATO acts as a hedge against future threats. Moreover, instability along Europe's border represents an insidious threat with an influx of refugees burdening the economies as well as criminal and terrorist organizations stressing the law enforcement and legal systems.

NATO enlargement and the membership action plan (MAP) enhance security and stability beyond expectations. Assured security provided by collective defense is responsible for creating the current conditions of stability in Central and Eastern Europe. Enlargement with its intrinsic transparency replaces the antiquated balance of power system that had destabilized Europe for centuries. NATO membership is a milestone process that permits candidates to institute reforms gradually through participation in OSCE, PfP, EAPC, and finally MAP. Participating in PfP exercises and peacekeeping operations reinforces the process. Selection for MAP is no guarantee for NATO membership, but participation pays big dividends and contributes to stability.

Since their induction into NATO, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have been making a positive contribution. In many areas, they are exceeding veteran members' contributions, and their inclusion has resulted in greater budgetary burdensharing. Unfortunately, their military contribution will lag until reforms and modernization take root.

The current MAP participants—Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Rumania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—are in various stages of progress towards membership. Slovakia and Slovenia have the greatest chance of membership since they have made the greatest progress, and their geographical position enhances NATO's tactical position. The prospects for the three Baltic states are also favorable because they have made significant progress, and membership paradoxically would end the friction between them and Russia. Their geographic

location detracts from NATO's defensive disposition and may require a greater naval presence in the Baltic Sea if a crisis erupts. Bulgaria and Rumania's chances more likely depend on their geographical location than any other factor. Although making progress, both need to continue with reforms before they are completely ready for membership. Nevertheless, they do provide a land bridge to Turkey and by extension the Middle East. Since the European NATO members rely heavily on road and rail for power projection, this land bridge may become crucial for potential crisis management operations in the Middle East. Albania and Macedonia are not ready in any capacity for NATO membership and are unlikely to become members in the near term.

NATO needs to institute several substantial organizational reforms that can harness the military potential of new (and old) members and transform the Alliance into a proficient expeditionary force.

The Alliance should rely on the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) as its high readiness force, composed of 10 integrated multinational divisions (IMD). The IMD comprises a host nation headquarters with member states contributing designated units according to their relative size and wealth. Integration is achieved by stationing allied units together, permitting the various allies to train and operate as a coherent whole. New members have the opportunity to buy or lease western equipment for the contributed units thereby allowing them to reduce domestic military expenditures. Common stationing also results in language immersion for soldiers and their families as well as exposing them to western culture and values. NATO members have the option of converting other divisions outside of the ARRC as well, but the ARRC must comprise IMDs. As a result, each member of the Alliance, from the smallest to the largest, can participate in NATO operations instead of allowing the few to shoulder the burden, and do so without sovereignty and command authority becoming issues.

Even though the ARRC has sufficient depth to counter all but the most dire threats, NATO must designate two other corps headquarters (e.g., European Corps [EUROCORP] and European Forces [EUROFOR]), fully staffed and with modern, redundant command, control, communications, and computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities to conduct sustained contingency missions. Each member also contributes combat support and combat service support units to form an area support group to provide the ARRC with a robust and sustainable logistical package. An integrated Special Operating Forces group would greatly enhance the shaping capabilities of NATO as well. Lastly, rotating the ARRC commander every 2 years permits each member country to experience the burden of command.

These reforms will allow members to lower the readiness of their other divisions as appropriate to the reduced threat. Behind the bulwark of the ARRC, member states can conduct timely partial or full mobilization as the strategic environment warrants.

With the reduced threat from the East, NATO can reorient its focus to the North African and Middle East regions to enhance their stability. In this regard, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Cyprus, and Malta gain greater importance and should be considered for MAP. Additionally, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland should receive open invitations to join the Alliance at their convenience because they will further strengthen the Alliance.

NATO enlargement and the structural reforms permit the U.S. Army to downsize its forces in Europe without downsizing its commitment to NATO. Although enlargement beyond Slovakia and Slovenia does result in geographical over-extension, the threat from the East is not there and the benefits outweigh the risks. The reforms permit greater interoperability between the United States and its Allies without exorbitant military expenditures. In

some future conflict, the U.S. Army will be gratified that NATO made these decisions.

The following recommendations will strengthen NATO and ensure that it remains the preeminent security provider for Europe:

- Offer NATO membership to Slovakia and Slovenia to extend access to Hungary and improve NATO's defensive disposition.
- Offer membership to the Baltic States to achieve closure with this troubled spot, and allow Russia and the Baltic States to move beyond a troubled past.
- Offer membership to Romania and Bulgaria for NATO to improve access to the Middle East region.
- Make a standing offer of membership to Austria, Finland, Ireland, Switzerland, and Sweden since they will strengthen the Alliance.
- Offer the MAP to Croatia, Bosnia, Cyprus, Malta, and Serbia to enhance stability and security in the Balkans and permit greater access to the Mediterranean basin.
- Convert the ARRC divisions into IMDs to assist in the assimilation of new members into the Alliance.
- Designate the ARCC as NATO's high readiness force, comprising 10 IMDs, an integrated area support group, and an integrated Special Forces Group.

No other security organization can compete with NATO. It is time for NATO to end the relevancy debate at the Prague summit and focus on more important matters. Enlargement will continue the wave of stability throughout Europe and beyond. The structural reforms will pay dividends beyond expectations. As in the past, a bold vision from America will serve to energize Europe.

PAX NATO: THE OPPORTUNITIES OF ENLARGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

Rarely has Europe enjoyed such security and stability in its history as it does today. In contrast to Europe's mercurial past in which countries fielded dozens of active divisions, today the number of divisions per country can be counted on one hand. This unprecedented period of peace is a result of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its foundation of collective defense.

Protecting Europe was no mean feat. Confronted by the powerful land and air forces of the Warsaw Pact, the NATO Alliance provided a suitable shield without exorbitant costs, permitting robust economic recovery and the maturation of strong, enduring democratic institutions. NATO was not just a military alliance, it was also an investment in Europe.

With the demise of the Soviet threat, the Alliance did not remain idle, resting on its laurels. Adhering to the ethos of adapt or die, NATO embraced a number of collective security initiatives designed to enhance European security and stability in the wake of significant military downsizing. As the only European multinational organization with military forces, NATO can exercise diplomacy backed by enforcement, making the Alliance the most versatile and effective security provider for Europe. Within this context, NATO enlargement represents an extension of NATO's continuing security initiatives.

NATO enlargement dovetails with U.S. predominant strategic goals regarding Europe: to nurture European integration along democratic, prosperous, and peaceful means; and to assist "allies and partners meet future challenges to collective interests that no nation can confront alone."¹ Enlargement is a natural extension of NATO's core

mission of collective defense.² Continuing with the Clinton administration's initiative, the Bush administration has made it clear that NATO enlargement is an important process for expanding security and freedom with no artificial lines "eastward and southward, northward and onward."³

When NATO convenes for the next round of enlargement at the Prague Summit on November 20-22, 2002, it will have three goals: (1) assess NATO's capabilities to meet emerging threats, (2) extend membership to the new European democracies, and (3) reaffirm NATO's relationships with Russia, Ukraine, and other Partners.⁴ During the remaining time leading to the summit, the Alliance needs to address and lay to rest the questions of NATO relevancy, the proposals of alternative organizations, and the critical views regarding enlargement.

This monograph assesses NATO's continued relevance to Europe's future security environment by evaluating: (1) NATO's unique contribution to European security and stability, (2) the benefits of enlargement and the membership action plan, (3) the contributions of the newest NATO members, (4) the attributes of the second round candidates, and (5) the need for organizational reforms to improve the integrated military structure. Lastly, this monograph will briefly discuss the future orientation of NATO and recommendations for future candidates.

Of all the organizations, NATO is the best positioned to provide assured European security and stability. Through NATO, North America and Europe can extend security and stability beyond the region without expending exorbitant costs and resources.

NATO'S UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION TO EUROPEAN SECURITY

Adapt or Die.

Is NATO relevant? If its members did not believe it to be, then NATO would have foundered long ago. The Alliance's vibrant vitality is a reflection of its past successes—a powerful catalyst for future successes—as well as its ability to adapt to the changing strategic environment.

NATO is the only organization that possesses the capability and political will to enforce policy quickly and decisively. The difference between NATO and all other security organizations is that "NATO's integrated command arrangements, its common procedures and doctrine, and the trust and bonds developed over decades of cooperation are an irreplaceable force multiplier, and, if coercive application of power is needed, they will ensure that the requisite military capabilities are provided in a politically effective multinational fashion."⁵ During the Cold War, the collective defense guarantee was the rationale of the Alliance, but in the post-Cold War era, greater security flexibility became apparent.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has evolved to meet the new security challenges. Although the Alliance remains committed to the fundamental tasks of security, consultation, deterrence and defense, it has added partnership, conflict prevention, and crisis management as part of its responsibilities. Partnership stresses transparency as a confidence measure, and greater dialogue and cooperation to increase joint action among allies. Conflict prevention and crisis management to include peace support operations represent a greater shift towards collective security.⁶

Under the aegis of partnership, NATO initiated Partnership for Peace (PfP) in January 1994 to enhance stability and security beyond NATO's borders. With a membership of 46 members, PfP seeks to increase

transparency in national defense planning and military budgeting, to ensure democratic control of national armed forces, and to increase interoperability of the PfP forces. In 1997, PfP members assumed a greater role in decisionmaking and planning, as well as greater political consultation. The Alliance pursued even greater security enhancements by concluding the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, the NATO-Ukraine Charter, and NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue. Moreover, all PfP members (except Tajikistan) belong to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), allowing them to discuss political and security issues, as well as enhancing cooperation on a variety of issues.⁷

The Alliance's adherence to arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation underscores its continued strategy to reduce threats and enhance stability without endangering collective defense. In these areas, cooperation among NATO, the United Nations (U.N.), European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Western European Union (WEU) is mutually reinforcing.⁸

NATO has undertaken a number of supplemental initiatives in support of its expanding mandate. In late 1993, it conceived the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) to make NATO assets and capabilities, particularly command and control, available for WEU-led operations, to include humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and collective defense. By extension, the CJTF concept assists in the eventual development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). NATO encourages the full development of the ESDP *within the Alliance* because it permits the European allies to assume greater responsibility in security and defense of Europe without necessarily involving the Alliance.⁹ Both CJTF and NATO's support for ESDP illustrate NATO's desire for Europe to assume a greater share of the security burden.

NATO enlargement represents the final initiative for extending stability and security in Europe. With the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the greatest threat to peace was the reemergence of tensions among the countries in Central and Eastern Europe where no conflict resolution system existed.¹⁰ Both the NATO and EU enlargement initiatives seek to defuse these potential powder kegs by offering the inducements of NATO and/or EU membership in exchange for internal reforms.

NATO enlargement is a continuation of Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which permits new members to join the Alliance upon the concurrence of all existing members. Enlargement contributes to security and stability in two ways. First, potential candidates seek membership in order to enjoy the assured security of collective defense. Second, the allure of NATO and EU membership is so great, candidates have taken steps to reform their economies, governments, and armed forces. No other initiative has enhanced stability as quickly and assuredly as NATO enlargement.

Compared to NATO, the OSCE and WEU cannot fulfill the diverse demands of the emerging security environment. OSCE and WEU reflect the European approach to security, placing "faith in international institutions, regimes, and norms to tackle problems of common concern."¹¹ The European security approach has merits but lacks the resoluteness of NATO.

NATO's critics see little need for the Alliance's integrated military structure and place much credence on consultations, agreements, and treaties. The vehicle for this vision is the OSCE, which remains a valuable forum for agreements on such matters as the "inviolability of state frontiers, confidence- and security-building measures, human rights, economic cooperation, and environmental safeguards."¹² In the 1990s, OSCE broadened its mandate to include crisis management and crisis prevention to include organizing peacekeeping forces in crisis regions.¹³

Nevertheless, it suffers from two significant limitations: it requires unanimous decisions before acting, and it lacks any enforcement capability for resolving a crisis.¹⁴ OSCE performs invaluable work in crisis regions, but the fact remains it can only act once a crisis has stabilized.

Theoretically, the WEU complements the OSCE by making available the armed forces of its member states for collective security. Unlike the OSCE, the WEU requires only a simple majority in its deliberative process.¹⁵ The WEU represents the traditional approach to alliances, which is an agreement among treaty members to form a coalition in time of war. Formal European coalition warfare dates back to The Thirty Years War and remained a balance of power instrument even as recently as World War II. An outgrowth of the 1948 Brussels Treaty Organization, the WEU was initially intended as an armaments control agency.¹⁶ With the establishment of NATO, it fell into the shadow of irrelevance. Its resurgence in the 1980s represented a European attempt to establish a security identity. In 1992, the WEU expanded its role through the Petersberg Declaration by adopting humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and crisis management tasks for combat forces. All WEU members pledged to make their military forces available with the objective of strengthening the defense component of the EU.¹⁷

The greatest and most enduring weakness of the WEU lies in the operational status of its armed forces—none exists. Despite declared aspirations, the WEU is a paper army, possessing no standing military forces, command structures, or logistical apparatus. Although it is easy enough to evoke the Brussels Treaty for the commitment of WEU member state forces, it must still reach consensus from within NATO. Hence, WEU coalitions are ad hoc, slow to form, and largely untested. The WEU lacks the structure and agility to respond to crises quickly and is therefore ill-suited for crisis response missions.¹⁸

The Revelations of the Balkan Conflicts.

The Balkan conflicts revealed the fallacy of relying on talks, negotiations, and agreements without an enforcement mechanism. They also exposed the deficiencies and limitations of ad hoc coalitions with poor unity of command. The efforts of the U.N., CSCE and the WEU proved woefully inadequate in resolving the conflicts. The litany of U.N. resolutions, talks, and peace initiatives did little to stabilize the crisis. The insertion of the U.N. Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) and creation of U.N. Protection Areas (UNPA) did little to quell the fighting. The numerous conflict resolution initiatives failed because the aims of the warring factions were irreconcilable. Croatia would not tolerate a Serb-controlled Krajina region, and the Bosniacs (Bosnian Muslims) sought to regain all Bosnian Serb (and Bosnian Croat if the opportunity arose) territory. The Krajina and Bosnian Serbs were more amenable to a negotiated settlement because they had attained their territorial aspirations. Not surprising, the Croatians and Bosniacs initiated the vast majority of fighting between fall 1993 and summer 1995.

Within this environment, the UNPROFOR tried to keep the peace although hamstrung by an arcane command authority system, stultifying rules of engagement, and inadequate combat capabilities. The warring factions soon exploited and victimized the UNPROFOR to gain political capital, and made a mockery of the European crisis management efforts. As the conflict dragged on, NATO became increasingly involved. Finally, in summer 1995, NATO launched Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, the air campaign that broke the deadlock in Bosnia-Herzegovina, compelling the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Dayton Accords. With NATO assistance, Croatia overran the Krajina, expelled the Serbs, and ended its conflict. The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) enforced the peace and set the conditions for *inter alia* OSCE and international organizations to operate. Particularly noteworthy is the

vast number of PfP members who have participated in the peacekeeping operations not only in Bosnia but also Kosovo and Macedonia. The conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia revealed that the Alliance was not only relevant but also essential.¹⁹

The WEU attempted to implement the CJTF in February 1997 when Albania slipped into anarchy in January as a result of financial collapse. It failed because the WEU could not reach consensus on whether to intervene and how to execute the operation. Likewise, the OSCE and the EU could not move beyond debate. In the end, "Operazione Alba" (Operation DAWN) became an Italian-led, ad hoc coalition, under the moniker Multinational Protection Force (MPF) to render humanitarian relief to Albania, starting May 21, 1997. That the Europeans conducted this operation without U.S. or NATO support is laudable, but the success was offset by WEU difficulties in consensus-building and the slow reaction time of nearly 5 months.²⁰

The Kosovo crisis from October 1998 to March 1999 once again demonstrated the limitations of talks, agreements, and peace plans. The capability and political will to use force were the essential ingredients to conflict resolution. On March 24, 1999, NATO launched the successful air campaign entitled Operation ALLIED FORCE, eventually forcing Serbian compliance of the Rambouillet Peace Accords. The swift insertion of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) demonstrated the relative quick manner in which the Alliance could execute policy on short notice.

Threat Assessment.

What is the threat? Well, thanks to the successful conclusion of the Cold War, no immediate threat to Europe exists. No analysis foresees a threat in the medium term. However, the world has its share of Caesars, Napoleons, and Hitlers. Their rise to power is a matter of circumstances and opportunity. Whenever such leaders rise to power, it is a

surprise and hence unpredictable. NATO must maintain a military component as a hedge against a genius for war. Simply because a township has not had a recent fire is no reason to dismantle the fire department. Prudence demands precaution.

Instability along Europe's borders is cause for concern as well. Continual conflict in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Caucus regions has resulted in economic disruption, diasporas, and creation of a safe habitat for transnational criminal and terrorist organizations. The critical economic resource for Europe remains oil because even temporary disruptions cause severe fluctuations in the stock market. The flow of refugees into Europe places a severe strain on European social welfare institutions, which results in greater economic deficits and higher taxes. Criminal and terrorist organizations are permitted to grow in regions where law and order have broken down. Their expansion to Europe and elsewhere resembles corporate growth. In fact, "terrorism incorporated" better characterizes the array of various terrorist organizations that have expanded their offices into Europe. Whatever their goals, they act and operate like a corporation. So despite no direct threat to Europe, in many ways the instability along its borders is more insidious and perhaps even lethal if left unchecked.

As hard as it is for critics to admit, NATO is a proven commodity. It serves as a forum for North American and European leaders to discuss military and nonmilitary matters. It ensures that North America and Europe remain in partnership on a host of issues.²¹ It would be the height of folly to dismantle an established, integrated organization and replace it with another's notion of security.

THE BENEFITS OF ENLARGEMENT AND THE MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN

The immediate benefit of NATO enlargement to European security and stability is the allure of NATO membership. The bedrock of the Alliance is collective

defense, and NATO candidates eagerly have complied with the prerequisites for membership in order to enjoy its protection. NATO enlargement represents a shift from the traditional balance of power security system that has destabilized Europe for centuries. NATO's use of transparency and other confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM) assures members and permits them to focus on domestic and economic issues rather than basic security.²² Transparency is an important factor in maintaining confidence among allies.

Under the old balance of power system, each country maintained a large army and/or maintained secret alliances with "friendly" countries in order to promote security. This security system was inherently unstable because the difference between an offensive army and a defensive army lay in the intentions of the practitioner. Hence, each country needed to maintain a large army as a hedge. The myriad of secret war plans and treaties did little to inspire confidence, and wars erupted more often from miscalculations, misreading of intentions, and basic human error. Transparency, a by-product of enlargement, has eliminated this unstable state of affairs.

The mechanics of NATO enlargement reflect a measured and progressive process for candidate membership. NATO recognizes that few states can meet its prerequisites on their own, so the Alliance prescribes gradual reforms and participation in various, though not sequential or hierarchical, organizations and programs—OSCE, PfP, EAPC, and the Membership Action Plan (MAP). Through these organizations, candidates can receive guidance and gain experience that assist them with reforms and their military capabilities.²³ Participation in NATO-led peacekeeping operations provides the opportunity to operate with other NATO countries and enhance interoperability.

OSCE, the most pervasive organization in Europe, is an excellent one for laying the foundation of security and

confidence among its members. PfP directs that its members adhere to the OSCE framework, and from there allows its members to develop interoperability and prepare their armed forces and military capabilities for Alliance operations. Noteworthy is the opportunity for members to participate in numerous PfP exercises, which greatly assist in the orientation of their armed forces along Alliance lines. The participation in numerous peacekeeping operations, particularly in the Balkans, not only increases interoperability with NATO, but it also increases burdensharing.²⁴

As the successor to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) seeks "to engage Partner countries, within limits, in political consultations and decisionmaking, in operational planning and in command arrangements for future NATO-led operations in which they participate."²⁵ Among other issues, EAPC focuses on "crisis management, arms control, international terrorism, defence planning, civil-emergency and disaster preparedness, armaments cooperation and peace-support operations."²⁶

The MAP is the final but in many respects the most important step towards membership. Its function is to help candidates "with advice, assistance, and practical support on all aspects of NATO membership."²⁷ Candidates submit an annual report (National Annual Program) addressing progress on political, economic, defense, resources, security, and legal issues, and receive feedback as well as political and technical advice. The MAP also serves as a clearing house on defense and military issues between NATO and the candidates, as well as an introduction to NATO defense planning.

Each organization emphasizes the founding concepts and principals of the other organizations and assists members to implement political, economic, and military reforms and capabilities at their own pace. In this manner, the process results in greater security and stability even before membership. The road to candidacy leads to a

winnowing process as NATO selects countries to join MAP, currently consisting of nine countries—Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Although participation in the MAP is not a guarantee of eventual NATO membership, the process alone underscores security and stability.

In making its selection, NATO assesses the suitability of the MAP countries regarding their potential to contribute to the Alliance, specifically, and the stability and security of Europe, generally. In his exhaustive analysis on NATO enlargement,²⁸ Thomas Szayna of RAND identifies seven areas for assessment:

1. GDP growth;
2. Per capita GDP;
3. Attainment of market economy;
4. Defense expenditure;
5. Defense expenditures per troop;
6. Attainment of democratic political institutions; and,
7. Strategic Rationale—strategic position and the armed forces.²⁹

The MAP assists candidates in the quest for membership. NATO makes it clear that no roadmap to NATO membership exists, and that attaining all the prerequisites is no guarantee of membership. For NATO to even consider a country for membership, specific political and military prerequisites are required:

1. Peaceful resolution of ethnic, external territorial, internal jurisdictional, and international disputes. Refrain from using threats or force in international relations that are inconsistent with the purposes of the U.N.
2. Institution of democratic and civilian control of the armed forces.

3. Commitment to the PfP Framework Document and active participation in PfP.

4. Establishment of free market economies and democratic political systems based on the rule of law.

5. Initiation of steps that allow the armed forces to operate seamlessly within the integrated military structure with the emphasis on collective defense and interoperability.³⁰

The dual approach of EU and NATO enlargement has had the most positive effect on stabilizing and democratizing the former Warsaw Pact countries, each of which could have easily reverted to its former balance of power security formula. That both enlargement initiatives have succeeded in stabilizing a potentially volatile region is a remarkable achievement.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE NEWEST NATO MEMBERS

A natural concern was that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic would be incapable of meeting their obligations to the Alliance. Once under the security umbrella, they might slip into a parasite status and not shoulder their fair share of the security burden. Their emerging market economies and antiquated armed forces might represent a drain on the Alliance. Once in the Alliance, the new members might not be willing to contribute to NATO's crisis management missions, especially peacekeeping.

Economic Contributions.

The forthwith economic contributions of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have largely allayed the majority of concerns. Each new member has made significant progress transitioning to a market economy. The gross domestic product (GDP) real growth rate of each new member shows a relatively swift and strong transition to a

market economy (Table 1). By extension, continued positive economic growth decreases the burden of military spending and military modernization on their economies.

| State | Population (in 000's) 2001 | GDP (PPP in Billions of U.S.\$) 2000 | GDP per Capita (PPP) 2000 ^a | GDP Real Growth Rate 2000 |
|-------------|----------------------------------|---|--|---------------------------------|
| Belgium | 10,259 | 259.2 | 25,300 | 4.1% |
| Czech Rep | 10,264 | 132.4 | 12,900 | 2.5% |
| Denmark | 5,353 | 136.2 | 25,500 | 2.8% |
| France | 59,551 | 1,448.0 | 24,400 | 3.1% |
| Germany | 83,030 | 1,936.0 | 23,400 | 3.0% |
| Greece | 10,624 | 181.9 | 17,200 | 3.8% |
| Hungary | 10,106 | 113.9 | 11,200 | 5.5% |
| Iceland | 278 | 6.8 | 24,800 | 4.3% |
| Italy | 57,680 | 1,273.0 | 22,100 | 2.7% |
| Luxembourg | 443 | 15.9 | 36,400 | 5.7% |
| Netherlands | 15,981 | 388.4 | 24,400 | 4.0% |
| Norway | 4,503 | 124.1 (1999 est.) | 27,700 | 2.7% |
| Poland | 38,634 | 327.5 | 8,500 | 4.8% |
| Portugal | 10,066 | 159.0 | 15,800 | 2.7% |
| Spain | 40,038 | 720.8 | 18,000 | 4.0% |
| Turkey | 66,494 | 444.0 | 6,800 | 6.0% |
| UK | 59,648 | 1,360.0 | 22,800 | 3.0% |
| USA | 278,059 | 9,963.0 | 36,200 | 5.0% |
| Canada | 31,593 | 774.7 | 24,800 | 4.3% |

^a Derived by dividing GDP (PPP) by population.

Source: CIA, *The World Fact Book*, 2001, Internet, <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>.

Table 1. General Wealth of NATO States.

NATO has established a goal of 2.0 percent of GDP as the minimum apportionment for defense spending.³¹ Poland spends 2.0 percent, Hungary spends 1.6 percent (U.S. Congressional Budget Office report cites 1.7 percent),³² and the Czech Republic spends 2.2 percent (Table 2). The three new members maintain expenditures at or above the Alliance's median (Italy)—1.7 percent of GDP defense spending. Comparatively, when over half of the current members are failing to meet the established goal, the new members are proving that they are trying to be responsible allies.³³ The 2.0 percent goal serves a useful purpose by compelling candidates to devote the necessary funds to make the transition to NATO's integrated military structure.

| State | Active Force Size 2000 ^a | Defense Expenditures (FY) ^b | Percent GDP Military Expenditure (FY) ^b | Defense Expenditure per Troop in U.S. \$ ^c |
|-------------|-------------------------------------|--|--|---|
| Belgium | 39,250 | \$2.5 billion (01) | 1.2 (99) | \$63,694 |
| Czech Rep | 57,700 | \$1.2 billion (01) | 2.2 (01) | \$20,797 |
| Denmark | 21,810 | \$2.5 billion (99) | 1.4 (99) | \$114,626 |
| France | 249,430 | \$39.8 billion (97) | 2.5 (97) | \$159,564 |
| Germany | 321,300 | \$32.8 billion (98) | 1.5 (98) | \$102,085 |
| Greece | 159,170 | \$6.1 billion (99/00) | 4.9 (99/00) | \$38,324 |
| Hungary | 43,790 | \$822 million (2000) | 1.6 (00) | \$18,771 |
| Iceland | 120 ^d | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Italy | 250,600 | \$20.7 billion (00/01) | 1.7 (00/01) | \$82,602 |
| Luxembourg | 899 | \$131 million (98/99) | 1.0 (98/99) | \$145,717 |
| Netherlands | 51,940 | \$6.5 billion (00/01) | 1.5 (00/01) | \$125,144 |
| Norway | 26,700 | \$3.1 billion (98) | 2.1 (98) | \$116,105 |
| Poland | 217,290 | \$3.2 billion (00) | 2.0 (00) | \$14,727 |
| Portugal | 44,650 | \$2.5 billion (97) | 2.6 (97) | \$55,991 |
| Spain | 166,050 | \$6 billion (97) | 1.1 (97) | \$36,134 |
| Turkey | 609,700 | \$10.6 billion (99) | 5.6 (99) | \$17,386 |
| UK | 212,450 | \$36.9 billion (97) | 2.7 (97) | \$173,688 |
| USA | 1,365,800 | \$276.7 billion (99) | 3.2 (99) | \$202,592 |
| Canada | 59,100 | 7.5 billion (00/01) | 1.3 (00/01) | \$126,904 |

^a The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2000-2001*, London: Oxford University Press, October 2000.

^b CIA, *The World Fact Book 2001*, Internet, <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>.

^c Derived by dividing defense expenditures by active force size.

^d Paramilitary forces.

Table 2. Defense Expenditures of NATO States.

Defense expenditures per troop indicate the general sophistication of the respective armed forces. Ideally, small, modernized active forces are the most use to the Alliance. The larger the defense expenditure per troop, the greater the potential of interoperability.³⁴ This issue represents the greatest shortfall for the new members. All three are in the bottom fifth and need to invest more money into modernization, but this expectation appears beyond their means in the short term. Without assistance, the new members cannot modernize quickly and hence be very interoperable with NATO.

Contrary to initial estimates that NATO enlargement would raise the Alliance's common costs, overall expenditures have declined. Three budgets constitute NATO's common costs:

- The civil budget is designated for the civilian agency headquarters, international staff, and economic and scientific programs;
- The military budget pays for NATO's military headquarters in Mons, Belgium, and its activities, as well as the Airborne Early Warning and Control System; and,
- The infrastructure budget, officially entitled the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP), focuses on projects to improve military readiness and capability, such as command, control, communications, and intelligence facilities, as well as transportation and storage facilities.³⁵

The financial contributions of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have lowered aggregate expenditures. Since the United States pays the most of any Alliance member, the effect of the three new members on its contribution is illustrative. The U.S. share of the civil budget has decreased from 23.5 percent to 22.5 percent, the military budget from 28.0 percent to 26.2 percent, and the NSIP budget from 28.3

percent to 25.2 percent. Although the three new members lowered the civil and military budget expenditures, NATO enlargement did require an increase of the NSIP budget to \$1.5 billion, mostly for infrastructure improvements, with the U.S. contribution amounting to \$400 million. Because most of the NSIP budget is dedicated to U.S. activities and facilities in Europe, the United States receives much more of the budget than the 25 percent it contributes.³⁶

Military Contributions.

In preparation for their inclusion in NATO's integrated military structure, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic continue restructuring and modernizing their armed forces. The military reforms are progressing reasonably well, but suffer from a lack of funding. As force reductions take effect and economies strengthen, more funding should be available for modernization.

All three members have retained conscription even though they are downsizing their militaries. Despite pledges of numerous units to NATO, deployable manpower shortfalls will plague their armed forces in the near term. Inadequate training proficiency and the profusion of obsolete Soviet equipment make interoperability with other Alliance members problematic. The prognosis is not calamitous. Integration is assured, but it will be slow.³⁷

The extant deficiencies provide cause to question the value of the enlargement process. Granted, the process does promote stability, but it appears NATO accepted the new members before they were adequately prepared, and this may be the case for the second round candidates, as well. Basing denunciations on enlargement because of poor military capabilities is too simplistic. An examination of the candidate process and the qualifications of the second round candidates illustrates that enlargement is beneficial to the Alliance, but it is only the beginning of the process instead of an end state.

THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE SECOND ROUND CANDIDATES

Economic Contributions.

Having a positive GDP real growth rate was important in the immediate post-Cold War period since many of the former Communist countries needed an incentive to make the transition to a market economy. It is becoming less significant as non-EU and non-NATO countries make the successful transition to market economies. High GDP per capita and relatively small populations are much more important because they permit higher defense expenditures, easing the transition into NATO. A candidate nation should have a GDP per capita figure at least equal to the Turkey (6,800—Table 1), which has the lowest figure among NATO members.³⁸ In this case, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia meet the standards (Table 3).

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia have fully functioning market economies and should be able to function within the EU if the current reforms continue. Bulgaria is making progress but is not yet ready to function within the EU in the medium term, whereas Romania has not made enough progress to have a fully functioning market economy. Albania and Macedonia are not on the EU membership track because both require substantial assistance in establishing a market economy.³⁹

Again, defense expenditures are expressed as a percentage of GDP and provide a general portrayal of the defense burden. Defense expenditures are relatively stable, rarely changing by more than 0.2 percent of GDP per year. NATO has made 2 percent of the GDP as the minimum level for candidate nations because this apportionment to defense helps them make the transition into NATO's integrated military structure more easily. In this category, only Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Romania meet the standard (Table 4).⁴⁰

| State | Population (in 000's) 2001 | GDP (PPP in Billions of U.S. \$) 2000 | GDP per Capita (PPP) 2000 ^a | GDP Real Growth Rate 2000 |
|------------|----------------------------------|--|--|---------------------------------|
| MAP States | | | | |
| Albania | 3,510 ^b | 10.5 | 3,000 | 7.5% |
| Bulgaria | 7,707 | 48.0 | 6,200 | 5.0% |
| Estonia | 1,423 | 14.7 | 10,000 | 6.4% |
| Latvia | 2,385 | 17.3 | 7,200 | 5.5% |
| Lithuania | 3,610 | 26.4 | 7,300 | 2.9% |
| Macedonia | 2,046 | 9.0 | 4,400 | 5.0% |
| Romania | 22,364 | 132.5 | 5,900 | 2.2% |
| Slovakia | 5,415 | 55.3 | 10,200 | 2.2% |
| Slovenia | 1,930 | 22.9 | 12,000 | 4.5% |

^a Derive by dividing GDP (PPP) by population.

^b CIA estimates for 2000.

Source: CIA, *World Fact Book 2001*, Internet, <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>.

Table 3. General Wealth.

| State | Active Force Size 2000 ^a | Defense Expenditures (FY) ^b | Percent GDP Military Expenditure (FY) ^b | Defense Expenditure per Troop in U.S. \$ ^c |
|------------|---|--|--|---|
| MAP States | | | | |
| Albania | 47,000 | \$ 42 million (99) | 1.5 (99) | \$894 |
| Bulgaria | 79,760 | \$344 million (00) | 2.4 (00) | \$4,313 |
| Estonia | 4,800 | \$70 million (99) | 1.2 (99) | \$14,583 |
| Latvia | 5,050 | \$60 million (99) | 0.9 (99) | \$11,881 |
| Lithuania | 12,700 | \$181 million (99) | 1.7 (99) | \$14,252 |
| Macedonia | 16,000 | \$76.3 million (00) | 2.2 (00) | \$4,769 |
| Romania | 207,000 | \$720 million (00) | 2.2 (00) | \$3,478 |
| Slovakia | 38,600 | \$380 million (00) | 1.7 (00) | \$9,844 |
| Slovenia | 9,000 | \$370 million (00) | 1.7 (00) | \$41,111 |

^a The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2000-2001*, London: Oxford University Press, October 2000.

^b CIA World Fact Book 2001, Internet,
<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>.

^c Derived by dividing defense expenditures by active force size.

Table 4. Defense Expenditures.

Defense expenditures per troop depict the general sophistication of the military. The NATO European median is \$82,602 (Italy), with Poland having the lowest expenditure of \$14,727 (Table 2). A low figure of defense expenditures per troop indicates a lower level of technological sophistication, hindering interoperability. Taken together, these figures determine whether a candidate nation is a potential contributor to, or a consumer of, NATO security.⁴¹ Only Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia meet or surpass Poland. Nevertheless, no MAP candidate shows much promise in attaining interoperability without significant assistance.

Democratic Reforms.

Except for Albania and Macedonia, all the MAP countries have fully established democratic political institutions. Romania and Slovakia still need to continue with systemic reforms though. Albania and Macedonia are only partly free, and neither is on the EU membership track, requiring assistance in establishing democratic institutions and the rule of law.⁴²

Geopolitical Considerations.

Strategic rationale has the most immediate practical impact on NATO missions. The geopolitical position of each country remains relevant in formulating policy and strategy. It affects how the Alliance projects power, the ability to defend its members, the commitment risks of new members to the Alliance, and Alliance cohesion. On the other hand, the armed forces of the candidates will not have an immediate, favorable impact on the capabilities of the Alliance.⁴³

Power projection is about access to a region or country. Its relative value to the Alliance in a geopolitical sense depends on the political milieu. In the past decade, the regional environment has changed significantly. Central and eastern Europe are no longer the threat they once posed

to security and stability. Given this new situation, access to the East is less important than access to Southeast Europe, the Mediterranean basin, and the Middle East, due to their regional instability.

The United States possesses significant power projection capabilities. Its sea- and airlift capabilities allow it to gain access globally and sustain a Joint Task Force for a considerable amount of time. European power projection capabilities cannot compete with the United States, and the EU will have no significant, dedicated air- and sealift within the next decade. Europe's power projection capabilities are therefore largely confined to rail and road networks, as well as commercial sea transports. This fact is not necessarily a point of disparagement. Rail and road are still the greatest medium for logistics, far eclipsing even the U.S. sea- and airlift capacity. Europe can project significant power if a land link exists to a crisis region. In this sense, geopolitical considerations remain a significant strategic factor.

Slovakia and Slovenia provide significant geographical advantages because they unite NATO's central and southern regions, permitting land access to Hungary, and by extension access to the greater part of the Balkans. Together, these countries enhance NATO's collective defense position by significantly shortening its border region and enhancing interior lines of communication. Militarily, NATO would be able to defend its eastern border with fewer forces. None has any real commitment risks for the Alliance. Except for minor disputes, they have good relations with their neighbors. Because of their positive western orientation, they will have a positive effect on the cohesion of the Alliance.

A subsequent enlargement of Romania and Bulgaria provides a land link to Turkey and Greece, permitting greater access to the Black Sea and the Middle East. As the Middle East conflict continues to fester and the region remains unstable, the geopolitical relative value of Romania and Bulgaria is a powerful incentive for NATO to

offer membership earlier than intended. With direct land links to Turkey, European NATO members have a greater opportunity to project significant forces into the Middle East region for crisis management missions. On the negative side, Romania and Bulgaria increase NATO's defensive borders substantially. Bulgaria still has territorial disputes with Greece and Macedonia, and Romania has territorial disputes with Moldova and Hungary. These disputes are not heated but neither are they resolved, and the potential of conflict remains in the near term. Romania and Bulgaria's orientation remains to the east, and this penchant can have adverse effects on Alliance cohesion. The relative value of their access to the Mediterranean Basin and Black Sea is the strongest argument for NATO membership.

The Baltic states offer few geopolitical advantages to the Alliance. Russia poses no threat in the near term, and access to the east is unnecessary. These states substantially increase NATO's border and because of their geographical location would be much harder to defend in a conflict, especially if Kaliningrad and Belarus are involved. However, political considerations are likely to override these disadvantages. NATO membership will deter Russia from meddling into the sovereignty of the three states and possible later revanchism. Paradoxically, membership will smooth disputes between the Baltic States and Russia because dialogue at the negotiating table would supercede Russia's traditional approach of intimidation and subversion. Given their history and pro-Western orientation, all three Baltic States would enhance Alliance cohesion. As a final point, Russia currently is disposed not to oppose Baltic States' membership, but if membership is offered, all three Baltic States should be included in one fell swoop in order to end the issue.

Albania and Macedonia offer little to the Alliance in the geopolitical sense. They increase NATO's defensive border and the mountainous terrain compounds the problems of defense. The lines of communication, ports, and general

infrastructure are poor. Each has significant territorial disputes with all its neighbors. Both teeter on the edge of becoming failed states, and offering membership for the purpose of stabilizing the region will saddle the Alliance with two potential albatrosses. Given their other problems, it is astounding that the Alliance accepted them into the MAP. Even in the long term, accepting these two states into the Alliance would detract from the Alliance. NATO membership is unlikely in the near term, and probably not before the other Balkan states are offered membership.

Military Contributions.

The armed forces of all candidates generally suffer from poor readiness. Short-term conscription obligations, poor levels of training, obsolete Soviet equipment, and the relatively small size of the armed forces conspire to limit military potential. The issue of Soviet equipment is not just a matter of obsolescence. Because the Soviet Union exported so much equipment during the Cold War, the probability of future adversaries having the same equipment as the new NATO members is high. In the interests of preventing fratricide, it would behoove the candidates to buy Western equipment.⁴⁴

Modernizing and reforming the active force will result in even smaller force structures and likely will require the establishment of readiness categories. Attempting to modernize existing large forces would result in exorbitant defense budgets, which in turn would stymie economic reforms. As NATO views the current candidate force structures, it should factor in that force reductions will result from modernization and reforms. Lastly, NATO must realize that its current military structure does not permit a swift or easy integration of new members.

Most Qualified Candidates.

Of the MAP states, Slovenia and Slovakia are the best candidates. Despite their military shortfalls, their

government, economic, and military reforms earmark them as making the transition into NATO most easily. Their geographic location provides NATO with greater access to the Balkans and physically joins Hungary with the Alliance. Additionally, they shorten NATO's borders and strengthen the geographical defense. Consequently, they would have a positive impact on NATO.

The Baltic States will likely join the Alliance as well, but for mostly political reasons. NATO membership assures their security against Russia encroachments and allows them to focus on reforms. More subtly, membership also offers closure to the era of Soviet occupation and intimidation. On the negative side, their armed forces are small and have obsolete Soviet equipment. Their geographic location lengthens NATO's border and over-extends NATO's central region. There is potential risk, but Russia is unlikely to oppose membership and will not pose a serious threat to their sovereignty in the future. In short, their accession into NATO would have a neutral impact.

Romania and Bulgaria are not quite ready for membership. Their armed forces are too large and have obsolete Soviet equipment. Although they are making progress, their reforms need work. However, they form a land bridge to Greece and Turkey and hence greater access to the Middle East. If the relative value of access to these regions increases, Romania and Bulgaria have a good chance of membership because of the turmoil in the Middle East. This alone makes the risk of lengthened borders and weakened geographical defense worthwhile. Hence, their membership would have a slight positive benefit the Alliance.

Albania and Macedonia offer little to the Alliance in any sense of the word. Their accession to NATO membership would have a negative impact and will not likely occur in the near term. Eventual membership likely will be tied to the accession of other Balkan states into the MAP.

Regardless of the benefits of NATO enlargement, persistent problems regarding new members will plague the Alliance. Assimilating former Warsaw Pact forces in NATO's integrated military structure is laborious and slow. Until interoperability and modernization problems are improved, new members' value to collective defense and the new missions will remain dubious for some time. Increased membership does not equate to increased combat effectiveness, and a collection of disparate units does not make a cohesive force. NATO has made great strides in the last decade, but needs to take the next step in reform. Assimilation of new members can be performed smoothly and effectively with organizational restructuring.

REORGANIZING NATO

The Alliance must adopt a force structure that allows the assimilation of new members into the integrated military structure. The Cold War approach of separate national forces within the Alliance was sufficient under pure collective defense, but with the addition of collective security tasks, interoperability and defense budget austerity assume greater importance.

Integrated Multinational Divisions.

Through the establishment of integrated multinational divisions (IMD), NATO can assimilate new members more effectively and quickly, as well as integrating long-standing members more cohesively. Under the IMD concept, members contribute units and key personnel to the host division in accordance with their relative size, specialization, and affordability. As with national divisions, the units are stationed together under the host division headquarters, operating under a uniform training and maintenance regimen.

This system allows the smaller members to pool resources and assign distinct, specialized units (armor, mechanized infantry, artillery, etc.) ranging from a

company to a brigade in size. New members will also have the opportunity to lease or buy existing equipment for their IMD-designated units rather than invest in expensive research and development enterprises. The IMD reduces military expenditures because each country fields fewer forces and uses the existing facilities and equipment. New members are able to absorb NATO procedures, English language, and western values much faster because of the immersion process. In short, the IMD increases cohesion, interoperability, and participation of all members at lower cost and resources.⁴⁵

Streamlining Corps.

Given the lack of an imminent threat and the expansion of NATO's mandate beyond collective defense, NATO can streamline its corps structure by designating the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) as the high readiness force and reclassifying the remaining corps into a lower readiness category. The ARRC would comprise 10 IMDs, with the corps command position rotating among the Alliance members every 2 years. The corps commander would have command authority over training and readiness. The Alliance members would contribute combat and combat service support units into an area support group to provide the ARRC with a robust and sustainable logistical support. Moreover, two other standing corps headquarters (e.g., European Corps [EUROCORP] and European Forces [EUROFOR]) are required for sustained contingency missions. All three corps would require modern, redundant command, control, communications, and computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) as a matter of course. Lastly, the ARRC needs to be rounded out with a Special Forces Group comprising Special Forces units from all member countries.⁴⁶

The divisions of the remaining corps could operate with reduced readiness without a significant impact on the effectiveness of the Alliance. Except in extreme cases (e.g.,

mobilization for a major war), the ARRC with its 10 divisions would have the capacity to conduct multiple, sustained operations. Activation of a lower readiness corps (e.g., I German/Netherlands Corps) would be predicated on the augmentation or rotation of deployed ARRC divisions in a crisis region and would have at least a year for preparation. Reducing the readiness of the remaining corps permits the European allies to focus resources on their ARRC IMD units. Naturally, countries will have the option to reorganize other divisions or even brigades into integrated units as well. The economic savings in essential areas—lower manpower requirements, fewer units to maintain, and fewer weapons and equipment to field—permit a greater focus on modernization and collective training. Although fewer divisions represent a calculated risk, the smaller, integrated ARRC permits the Europeans to field modern, interoperable forces at less cost and manpower, and with fewer resources.

Despite NATO's encouragement of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), any type of European force that even hints of independence from NATO is being counterproductive. Despite the rhetoric, ESDP has far to go before becoming a functional security organization. Significant shortfalls in manpower, air- and sealift, command and control, combat support and combat service support make it unlikely that ESDP will have a practicable military capability within the end of the decade. Other than those deficiencies, ESDP promises to be as effective as the WEU.

All NATO members must recognize that future successful contingency operations require the complete involvement of the Alliance. Using hypothetical situations to justify creating a European force is really a feeble excuse. In the future, if the European partners really feel strongly about a contingency operation, then they must address the matter at Brussels and make the case for NATO involvement. ESDP and the like simply undermine the Alliance. If the above recommended structural reforms are

adopted, Europeans will automatically assume a greater share of the security burden without the need to establish their own security pillar.

WHITHER NATO?

The near and perhaps mid-term points of instability lay in the Middle East and the Maghreb. NATO involvement in these regions is necessary for the stability of Europe, even though military intervention will not be needed in most cases. NATO should consider Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Cyprus, and Malta as the next MAP candidates. Except for Malta, all have territorial disputes that require resolution before NATO membership is considered; however, membership is a significant incentive, especially if seen as a stepping stone to EU membership. Moreover, a stable Balkans permits the release of NATO and PfP forces as part of a new focus beyond Europe.

NATO should extend an open invitation to Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland to join the Alliance at their convenience. All are qualified to be productive members of NATO and would underscore the cohesion of western values. Austria is particularly important because of its central geographical location and superb east-west and north-south lines of communication. Nevertheless, the initial dialogue should occur discreetly in order for each country to debate the matter and prepare its constituency for membership.

As NATO continues to mature as a security provider, it must posture towards areas of instability in a clean break from its Cold War orientation. Its stabilizing influence on the Mediterranean basin can be profound and can have a significant impact in curbing illegal immigration, crime, and terrorism. It might be a while before NATO's security umbrella includes these regions, but at least they can enjoy some of its shade.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY

Generally, NATO enlargement permits the U.S. Army to strengthen military ties with new partners. The integrated multinational division initiative permits the Army to downsize its forces in Europe without diminishing its commitment. Integrated members will have the opportunity to train closely with Americans, become familiar with American English and military terminology, and observe American values and democratic ideals. Over time, both procedural and technical interoperability will increase allowing allies to operate with American units seamlessly. Under this approach, new members are more apt to buy or lease American equipment once they become familiar with it, thereby increasing interoperability even more.

The scope of NATO enlargement can have a major impact on U.S. ground forces. From a pure tactical point of view, the inclusion of Slovenia and Slovakia represents the most secure position. They provide a solid front, eliminating the major salients and reentrants along NATO's eastern border. For contingency plans, such a military arrangement is the most preferable. Adding the Baltic states complicates defensive plans more than mere geographical extension. The shifting of forces into any or all three of the states incurs the risk of piecemeal deployment or precarious massing of forces through the bottleneck formed by Belarus and Kaliningrad Oblast. A visceral contingency plan would include the seizure of the Kaliningrad Oblast. However, without Russian acquiescence, such a move incurs extreme strategic risks.

Although beyond the scope of this monograph, a more prudent contingency plan relies heavily on naval power to defend the states. Tactical prudence dictates that Slovakia and Slovenia must become members before or at the same time as Romania and Bulgaria to assure a land bridge. Even so, Romania and Bulgaria create a demonstrable extension of NATO's borders, and the mountainous terrain that

characterizes these two countries could easily swallow every existing NATO division and still be wanting. Nevertheless, many of the tactical implications are academic since Eastern Europe has never known such stability and security. The military risk exists but is too minor to warrant undue anxiety.

Enlargement also offers opportunities for the shift of U.S. bases farther east. German domestic politics increasingly has stifled U.S. training opportunities while increasing expenses for the past decade. Any soldier stationed in Germany will attest that U.S. barracks and caserne facilities are little changed from World War II despite the periodic renovations. The Army may find casernes and training areas in Poland and the Czech Republic to be more accommodating and easily modernized. Certainly the potential, larger training areas and fewer restrictions on military activities make such a move an attractive proposition.

If such a move farther east is eventually envisioned, the best opportunity would be as part of the conversion of the two U.S. divisions in Germany to IMDs. The additional manpower and resources of the new members permits the Army to shift significant combat, combat support, and combat service support units elsewhere without adversely affecting the military capability of NATO if the recommended reforms are instituted. The time is ripe for the U.S. Army to act on these opportunities. A decade from now may be too late.

CONCLUSION

The NATO Alliance is the most robust, flexible, and proven security organization in Europe. OSCE may have greater membership, but it lacks the ability to enforce its declarations. WEU is the embodiment of obsolete coalition systems, lacking a standing command structure, logistical apparatus, and armed forces. NATO evolved successfully during the past decade to meet the challenges of the

changing strategic environment. Its relevancy is no longer in question, and now is the time to institute new structural reforms. Alternative organizations are simply a waste of resources and funding. The wheel has already been invented.

NATO can improve its strategic position and cohesion by pursuing the following:

- Offer NATO membership to Slovakia and Slovenia to extend access to Hungary and improve NATO's defensive disposition.
- Offer membership to the Baltic States to achieve closure with this troubled spot and allow Russia and the Baltic States to move beyond a troubled past.
- Offer membership to Romania and Bulgaria for NATO to improve access to the Middle East region.
- Make a standing offer of membership to Austria, Finland, Ireland, Switzerland, and Sweden since they will strengthen the Alliance.
- Offer MAP to Croatia, Bosnia, Cyprus, Malta, and Serbia to enhance stability and security in the Balkans and permit greater access to the Mediterranean basin.
- Convert the ARRC divisions into IMDs to assist in the assimilation of new members into the Alliance.
- Designate the ARCC as NATO's high readiness force, comprising 10 IMDs, an integrated area support group, and an integrated Special Forces Group.

NATO cannot afford to rest on its laurels and transform the Alliance into a European country club. The Alliance provides hope to nonmembers and security for members. Under collective defense, NATO members have cast off the divisive and detrimental balance of power pursuits and

focused on economic and political reform. Europe is a more stable, secure, and prosperous continent because of NATO. There is no good reason for this not to continue.

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12. Richard H. Ullman, *Securing Europe*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991, p. 64. In 1994, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) evolved into the OSCE.

13. *The Organization For Security and Cooperation in Europe*, NATO Handbook, Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001, pp. 342-352. The achievements of CSCE/OSCE are impressive. Its involvement in The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), the Dayton Peace Agreement, numerous elections in Bosnia and Kosovo, the Kosovo Verification Mission followed by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, and peacekeeping operations in Nagorno-Karabakh and Chechnya have contributed significantly to peace and stability.

14. Ullman, p. 64.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 50-53.

17. *The Western European Union (WEU)*, NATO Handbook, Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001, p. 361. Hereafter referred to as *WEU*.

18. *WEU*, pp. 364-365; Ullman, p. 365; *Concept*, para. 30.

19. The author was a Balkans analyst at SHAPE, Belgium, from 1993 to 1996, including duty as the EUCOM/JTFPP liaison officer to Bosnia-Herzegovina Command (UNPRFOR headquarters in Sarajevo) from October 1995 to January 1996.

20. John G. McGinn and Timothy Liston, "Beyond the Rhetoric and Acronyms: The Reality of European Military Capabilities," *National Security Studies Quarterly*, Vol. VII, Issue 1, Winter 2001, pp. 80-81.

21. "The Once and Future NATO," *Chicago Tribune*, June 3, 2002, Internet <http://ebird.dtic.mil/Jun2002/e20020604theonce.htm>, pp. 1-2.

22. Thomas-Durell Young, *Reforming NATO's Military Structure: The Long-Term Study and Its Implications for Land Forces*, Carlisle

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23. Szayna, *Enlargement*, pp. 26-34.

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25. Robert E. Hunter, "Getting Cinderella to the Ball," *NATO Review*, Vol. 49, Autumn 2001, p. 11.

26. Hunter, p. 11.

27. *Membership Action Plan*, NATO Handbook, Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001, p. 65. Hereafter referred to as *MAP*.

28. Szayna, *Enlargement*; and Thomas S. Szayna, "NATO Enlargement: Forecasting the 'Who' and 'When'," *National Security Studies Quarterly*, Summer 2001, Vol. VII, Issue 3, pp. 31-92. Hereafter referred to as Szayna, "Forecasting."

29. Szayna, *Enlargement*, pp. 51, 55-56, 61-62, and 72.

30. *Enlargement Study*, paragraphs 4-6, 70, 72-73; *MAP*, p. 65. Although MAP countries have the latitude to establish their own priorities and timelines, they must achieve the following goals: "settling any international, ethnic or external territorial disputes by peaceful means; demonstrating a commitment to the rule of law and human rights; establishing democratic control of their armed forces; and promoting stability and well-being through economic liberty, social justice, and environmental responsibility."

31. Szayna, "Forecasting," p. 44.

32. John J. Lis and Zachary Selden, *Integrating New Allies Into NATO*, Congressional Budget Office; Internet <http://www.cbo.gov>, Chapter 2, p. 1. Hereafter referred to as Lis and Selden, *Integrating*.

33. John J. Lis and Zachary Selden, *NATO Burdensharing After Enlargement*, Congressional Budget Office, August 2001, Internet, <http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=2976&sequence=0&from=0>, Chapter 1, p. 14. Hereafter referred to as Lis and Selden, *Burdensharing*. Hungary is projected to increase its expenditure to 1.8 percent by 2001.

34. Szayna, "Forecasting," pp. 44-45; Lis and Selden, *Integrating*, chapter 2, p. 1.

35. Lis and Selden, *Burdensharing*, Summary, p. 4, and Chapter 3, p. 1.

36. *Ibid.*, Summary, p. 4-5, Chapter 3, pp. 2-4. In 1999, the civil budget was \$161 million, the military budget was \$496 million, and the NSIP was \$458 million. The United States pays 25 percent of each budget.

37. See Raymond A. Millen, *Tweaking NATO: The Case for Integrated Multinational Divisions*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2002, pp. 16-17.

38. Szayna, "Forecasting," pp. 40-42.

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 54-56.

40. *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

41. *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46. The figures differ from Szayna's original calculations because he used older data files, but the conclusions remain valid.

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 50-55. Szayna uses the Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org/ratings) in reaching his conclusions.

43. Szayna, *Enlargement*, pp. 72-73.

44. See Millen, pp. 20-24. A detailed overview of new candidate armed forces highlights the institutional problems.

45. See *Ibid.*, pp. 24-30. The detailed analysis of the IMD concept strengthens the argument for its adoption.

46. See *Ibid.*, pp. 30-33.

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